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Introduction 
 
Historic episodes of financial crises highlight the need for Early Warning Systems (EWS) for 
banking crisis prediction; over 1980-1996, three-quarters of IMF countries experienced 
banking distress (Lindgren, Garcia and Saal, 1996). Crises were not restricted to particular 
geographic regions, levels of development or banking system structures2. A working 
definition of a banking crisis is the occurrence of severely impaired ability of banks to 
perform their intermediary role. Restriction to a few banks constitutes a localised crisis 
whereas collapse of the banking system constitutes a systemic crisis. 
 
Systemic crises have significant direct and indirect costs. According to Caprio and Klingebiel 
(1996), bailout costs average 10% of GDP, with some crises much more costly, e.g. the 
Mexican Tequila Crisis (1994) cost 20% of GDP whilst the Jamaican crisis (1996) cost 37% 
of GDP. There are additional costs of foregone economic output (notably reduced investment 
and consumption) owing inter alia to credit rationing and uncertainty. Hoggarth and Sapporta 
(2001) estimate that cumulative output losses from banking and twin crises3 were much 
greater in OECD countries (23.8% of GDP) than in emerging market economies (13.9%). 
Banking crises alone cost an average of 5.6% of GDP and twin crises 29.9%. 
 
The IMF uses an early warning system (EWS) to monitor currency crises but has no explicit 
EWS for banking crises. Likewise, private sector institutions focus on currency crisis 
prediction. This may partly reflect the historically high prevalence of currency crises; in a 
study of 20 countries, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) found that during the 1970s there were 
26 currency crises and only 3 banking crises (due to financial repression). However, banking 
crises quadrupled in the post-liberalisation period of the 1980s and 1990s. Further increases 
are foreseeable as additional emerging market countries undergo financial liberalisation, while 
in more advanced economies, securitised financial markets develop new financially 
engineered products whose behaviour during recessions is not well understood. For example, 
Chan et al (2006) note the close relationship between banks and hedge funds which undertake 
unregulated investments. Related risks are not well understood, but as the LTCM crisis in 
                                                 
2 Caprio and Klingebiel (1996). 
3 Defined as cases where a currency crisis occurs within the period 2 years before and after the banking crisis. 
Whereas one might anticipate that a currency crisis would mitigate the impact of the banking crisis by increasing 
the profitability of export and import-competing firms, it seems that this is more than offset by a greater level of 
financial disruption in a twin crisis, in many cases including a cut-off of international credit, that may aggravate 
the banking crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999). 
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1998 demonstrated4, hedge funds with highly leveraged positions can rapidly magnify 
domestic and international systemic risks, thereby increasing chances of contagion. Hence the 
need to devise a reliable EWS for banking crisis prevention remains more pressing than ever. 
 
Although models have been developed to allow banking crisis prediction, their comparative 
performance is difficult to evaluate. Current models have been derived from various historic 
datasets and more importantly, by using different dependent variables and overall 
methodologies. Consequently, leading indicators may appear inconsistent and in-sample and 
out-of-sample results differ. This paper attempts to resolve some of the current ambiguity on 
predictive efficiency and indicator robustness. Our contribution includes the following: We 
test two of the main EWS in the literature (multivariate logit and signal extraction) using a 
single panel dataset. The cross-country and time-series coverage is more extensive than most 
previous studies. We also consider refinements to current EWS by considering how banking 
crisis theory could help to improve specification and variable choice. In the specific case of 
signal extraction work we also distinguish country specific from general effects and construct 
composite indicators. 
 
In sum, our results show (1) that given the same underlying data, the choice of EWS does 
make a difference to predictive efficiency. (2) Given the EWS model, the choice of dependent 
variable determines predictive capacity. (3) Transforming indicators including 
standardisation, lags and interaction terms improves the performance of the EWS. (4) Some 
models are better for developing country-specific EWS whilst others are suited to global 
EWS. (5) Combining variables into composite indicators improves crisis predictive ability. 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: Section I provides a brief theoretical review 
of banking crises which motivates the choice of indicators. Section II explains the 
methodology we adopt, including the theory behind the logit and signal extraction methods, 
construction of the banking crisis dependent variable and our dataset. Section III presents our 
results, whilst section IV concludes. 
 
1 Theoretical overview of banking crises. 
 
This section briefly indicates why the indicators used in EWS models such as Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1998) (who use the logit method) are associated with banking crises.5 This 
enables us to assess the variables validity and also to recommend extensions. 
                                                 
4 Davis (1999) 
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Generally, banking systemic risk reflects a correlation of performance between institutions. 
One possibility is that such crises can be purely self fulfilling, i.e. they materialise through 
individual liquidity failures of solvent banks that become contagious. In these cases, crises 
can be driven by asymmetric information and associated bank runs. Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) emphasised the role of confidence in precipitating runs and that arbitrary shifts in 
investors risk expectations explain seemingly irrational behaviour of consumers running on 
banks; a banks underlying financial position is almost irrelevant once panic ensues. Hence 
individual bank failure may spread through contagion associated with asymmetric information 
and in this context systemic banking crises are self-fulfilling. This view has been criticised on 
the view that there is usually a fundamental explanation for such events. 
 
George (1998) suggests that systemic risks arise through the direct financial exposures6 
which tie firms together. If systemic risk is sufficiently deep, (i.e. if correlations between 
individual bank risks are particularly high), then crises could be triggered. Hence a further 
possibility is that there could be counterparty claims between banks (e.g. via interbank 
exposures) that lead to widespread failures.  
 
EWS to date have typically ignored the possibility of pure self-fulfilling crises and crises 
caused simply by counterparty exposures. This can be justified because historically the vast 
majority of banking crises have been caused by financial institutions underestimating their 
common exposure to economy wide systematic risk (Borio, Furfine and Lowe, 2001). This 
may link to asymmetric information as if one significant bank fails, a systemic crisis may 
develop because the presence of such asymmetric information means depositors are unable to 
evaluate prospects for similar banks in terms of balance-sheet exposure to economy wide 
systemic risks (Kaufman and Scott, 2003). 
 
Accordingly, macroeconomic movements that crystallise risks particular to banking systems, 
namely interest rate, credit, liquidity and market risk have been the key determinants of 
banking crises in the last twenty years (Ergungor and Thompson, 2005). Correspondingly, in 
most EWS studies, the explanatory variables used mainly capture macroeconomic factors that 
could generate systemic risk via such common shocks. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
5 We note that Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) (who use the signal extraction method) use a different set of 
variables more closely associated with currency crisis prediction. 
6 Exposures include inter-bank transactions, counterparty risk, or third party (non-bank institutional) failure. 
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Interest rate risk forms an inherent part of banking activities since assets have longer duration 
than liabilities. Term structure shifts towards short-term liabilities (inverted yield curves) 
adversely affect bank balance sheets by eroding bank spreads. Simultaneously, banks may 
suffer prepayment risk if long-term rates decline and borrowers refinance at lower rates. 
These outcomes adversely affect bank balance sheets and if there is significant exposure to 
interest rate risk, net worth of the banking system becomes vulnerable.  
 
Oviedo (2004) highlights the counter-cyclicality of interest rates; lower interest rates are 
associated with economic booms when crises are less likely. Consequently, during booms, 
banks may use low-cost deposit financing to invest heavily in particular sectors which appear 
profitable and where collateral values are high. This increased appetite for long-term projects 
means duration mismatch and interest rate risk are likely to accumulate during the boom 
phase so that unexpected interest rate increases or moves towards inflation targeting in the 
downturn could lead systemic interest rate risk to materialise. Hence the inclusion of real 
interest rates in EWS and the observed, positive correlation between real interest rates and 
banking crisis probability in recent work (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Hardy and 
Pazarbasioglu, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerretche, 
2001).  
 
Another symptom of banking crises is increased credit risk or the probability that a borrower 
will default, converting an asset into a bad or non-performing loan (NPL). Although banks 
enjoy advantages in screening and monitoring borrowers, both of which reduce credit risk, the 
high levels of NPLs associated with crises indicate risk assessment by banks deteriorates 
during pre-crisis periods.  
 
One reason for and consequence of inadequate credit risk evaluation is the procyclical 
movement of lending and asset prices which allows for interaction of financial cycles and 
business cycles. Periods of high output growth raise collateral values and as a result, during 
booms loan contracts become less informationally dependent. Asymmetric information does 
not restrict credit availability because bank managers succumb to euphoric and herding 
behaviour7, utilising biased information sets to make investment decisions. As a result, they 
ignore the potentially high default probabilities that could occur under recessionary states and 
under-price credit risk. Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2001) attribute these sub-optimal 
behavioural responses to difficulties in measuring time series of credit risk and to incentive 
                                                 
7 Davis (1995). 
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based managerial contracts which reward loan volume. As lending increases, this further 
inflates asset prices, which raises collateral values and perpetuates the endogenous cycle 
(Davis and Zhu 2004). The boom phase ends when shocks, such as asset price collapses, turn 
the process backwards; during recessions managers may overestimate risk so that cyclical 
downturns reverse the financial accelerator. As assets markets collapse, collateral values 
decline and NPLs rise. Because asymmetric information becomes disproportionately 
important for loan officers, lending spreads are artificially high and intermediaries hold excess 
capital and provisions. Ultimately, credit rationing prevents borrowers with profitable projects 
from obtaining funds and the recession deepens. 
 
Credit risk may be particularly high and correlated between institutions when herding focuses 
boom-phase investment to specific sectors of the economy. Over-investment in real estate 
(particularly commercial) has been a well-documented feature of banking crises8 because the 
value of bank capital increases if real estate forms the asset base. Bank lending therefore 
magnifies the real estate cycle, leading to further financial acceleration and financial 
instability (Herring and Wachter, 1998; Borio, Furfine and Lowe, 2001, Davis and Zhu 2004, 
2005). Furthermore credit risk may be magnified by regulation that limits diversification.9 
 
In the context of banking crises, market risk is intertwined with credit risk. Market risk 
reflects the probability that price-volatility of specific assets affects the net worth of banks. 
Such adverse price movements may arise through shifts in market expectations in anticipation 
of cyclical downturns. Alternatively, specific asset groups may be hit by idiosyncratic factors, 
e.g. oil price volatility following political events. Although market risk is diversifiable, 
regulation limiting types of assets held may impede this. Alternatively, excessive market risk 
may be borne during boom phases, as over-optimism may concentrate portfolios in assets 
whose prices move procyclically, e.g. real estate (Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999, Craig et al 
2005). Since credit risk is also procyclical, the link between the two risks becomes apparent 
when asset price collapses realise market risk and low collateral values realise credit risk.  
Banks may also be exposed to market risk if their portfolios are concentrated on equities and 
currencies; if they fail to adequately provision against price volatility, then adverse price 
shocks can jeopardise the net worth of the banking system.  
 
                                                 
8 See FDIC (1997) for the relationship between commercial real estate and US banking crises during the 1980s 
and 1990s. 
9 The Texan Banking crisis was driven by regulation which forced regional banks and S&Ls to invest within 
their state. Texan institutions over-invested in the Texan oil industry which entered recession in 1987 (FDIC, 
1997). 
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Banking liquidity risk reflects the probability that banks will be unable to satisfy the claims of 
depositors because the ratio of illiquid assets relative to liquid liabilities is too high. In the 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, liquidity risk drives idiosyncratic bank runs. Liquidity 
risk also links to adverse information models of banking crises (Santos, 2000). Chari and 
Jagannathan (1988) modify the Diamond and Dybvig model to show that when depositors 
assimilate adverse information (e.g. signals of recession or asset market collapses) they 
anticipate that bank profitability will suffer. Resulting bank runs generate systemic liquidity 
problems. These runs are distinct from the Diamond and Dybvig model where runs on solvent 
banks occur even when depositors have no legitimate evidence to suspect insolvency. Rather, 
in this case, depositors are more likely to run on genuinely insolvent banks. Hence Gortons 
(1988) observation that panics are associated with recessions and Jacklin and Bhattacharyas 
(1988) suggestion that the release of information indicating low asset values or poor 
performance of a bank can generate liquidity risk. 
 
Financial liberalisation provides another source of the systemic risks mentioned, hence the 
well-documented association between liberalisation and crises; in the Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999) sample, over 70% of banking crises were preceded by financial liberalisation within 
the last five years and the probability of banking crisis conditional on financial liberalisation 
having occurred is higher than the unconditional probability of banking crisis. Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1998) also find financial liberalisation increases crisis risk within a few 
years of the liberalisation process. 
 
High real interest rates and increased interest rate volatility are typical consequences of 
financial liberalisation, especially in developing countries (Honohan, 2000). During financial 
repression, imposed ceilings mean real interest rates cannot adjust to clear credit markets and 
credit rationing results in non-market, usually state-directed, credit allocation. Although 
interest rate risk considerations are likely to be subordinate when states allocate credit, 
interest rate ceilings have some risk limiting effect. However in post-liberalised environments, 
wider spreads and increased competition could cause an accumulation of systemic interest 
rate risk which may be more likely to materialise because of higher interest rate volatility. 
 
Another effect of financial liberalisation may be to increase credit risk. In liberalised markets, 
increased competition may erode bank charter values so that without adequate supervision 
and regulation, banks forgo prudent credit risk assessment in a bid to catch borrowers. Hence 
financial liberalisation can exaggerate procyclicality of asset prices by fuelling a consumption 
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boom (Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2002)). Craig et al (2005) suggest that credit risk increases 
following liberalisation because the rapid increases in loan volumes constrain credit risk 
assessment. This may be exacerbated in the presence of government safety nets; Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998) show deposit insurance is a significant leading indicator of 
banking crisis and the same authors (2002) show explicit deposit insurance increases the risk 
of moral hazard when institutions are weak. Where financial liberalisation does increase asset 
price volatility, there may also be increased liquidity risk borne by the system since banks are 
unable to sell assets at par when asset prices collapse. 
 
Looking at the indicators typically used in EWS models, in the light of the discussion above, 
we would thus expect rapid real credit growth and increases in private sector credit/ GDP10 
during pre-crisis periods, indicating credit risk accumulation. Similarly procyclicality of 
financial instability implies GDP growth should capture boom and bust cycles. Liquidity risk 
is incorporated by bank cash plus reserves as a proportion of total bank assets; the lower this 
ratio the higher the systemic liquidity risk. Macroeconomic shocks which could trigger 
cyclical downturns thereby increasing NPLs include adverse movements in terms of trade and 
correspondingly currency depreciations, especially for small open economies. The latter also 
indicates vulnerability to currency crisis, as does M2/ foreign exchange reserves since lower 
ratios imply impaired ability to defend the currency.  Real interest rates are used as a direct 
indicator of interest rate risk. High inflation signals policy mismanagement which causes 
higher nominal interest rates at the expense of lenders. Corresponding increases in interest 
rate volatility should also capture interest rate risk. Higher inflation may also, to a certain 
extent, reflect market risk of asset price booms. Direct use of asset prices such as real estate 
for proxying market risk in EWS models has been limited due to lack of data outside the 
OECD countries. On the other hand exchange rate based market risk is proxied by the terms 
of trade and currency depreciations. 
 
Policy mismanagement is also reflected in low fiscal surpluses/ GDP. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) include this variable because it indicates governments reluctance to 
restructure fragile banking systems and because high deficits prevent successful financial 
liberalisation.  Real interest rates also act as a proxy for financial liberalisation. Furthermore, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache rely on the level of GDP per capita as a structural economic 
development measure which should be positively related to the quality of banking 
                                                 
10 However, the level of the credit/GDP ratio is rather an indicator of economic and financial development. 
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regulation11. Given these leading indicators, we now turn to describe the construction of the 
banking crisis dependent variable and the actual models used to predict banking crises. 
 
2 Data, variables and specifications 
 
2.1 The Banking Crisis Variable 
 
The most commonly-cited problem with EWS developed to date is the inconsistency in the 
banking crisis dependent variable, which is necessarily defined with a degree of subjectivity 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998, Eichengreen and 
Arteta, 2000). There is no unique quantitative variable for banking crisis. The problem lies in 
the fact that banking crisis is an event, so proxies for banking crises would not necessarily be 
perfectly correlated with banking crises themselves. For instance, if we were to use a measure 
for banking insolvency such as aggregate banking capital, we would need to define a lower 
bound threshold for a crisis event. However, government intervention or deposit insurance 
could prevent crisis and the threshold could still be violated. Another issue is that not all 
crises stem from the liabilities side (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999); problems in asset quality 
can also erode banking capital so that a single proxy variable would not pick up all crisis 
events. As a result the dummy is constructed on the basis of several criteria which vary 
according to the study. The main classifications are to be found in Caprio and Klingebiel 
(1996, 2003), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2005), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
and Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996). 
 
Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) focus on the solvency side of crisis and define systemic crisis as 
an event when all or most of banking capital is exhausted12. Insolvency was judged on the 
basis of official data and published reports by financial market experts; if official data 
recorded positive banking system capital but experts judged it to be negative, they recorded 
systemic crisis13. Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) subsequently updated their database to the 
period 1980-2002 and identified 93 countries as having experienced systemic crises. 
 
                                                 
11 Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) also incorporate two other institutional variables: a deposit insurance 
dummy (where explicit deposit insurance means the dummy value is 1) and a law and order dummy. 
12 They stipulate that non-performing loans as a proportion of entire loans of the banking system must be in the 
range of 510% or less. 
13 On this criterion, they judged 58 countries to have experienced systemic crisis over the post-1970s period with 
many experiencing repeated episodes. 
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Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) used a more specific set of four criteria14 where 
achievement of at least one of the conditions was a requirement for systemic crisis, otherwise 
bank failure was non-systemic. The authors admitted they relied on judgement if there was 
insufficient evidence to support their crisis criteria; on this basis they established 31 systemic 
crises in 65 countries over the 1980-1994 period. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) 
conducted a follow up study and extended the sample to 1980-2002. Using the same criteria 
as before, they find 77 systemic crises over 94 countries. 
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) use criteria similar15 to 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) identified 26 
systemic banking crises over 20 countries during the period 1970-1995. Of the 26 crises, 19 
are twinned with currency crises and the remaining 7 are pure banking crises.  
 
Even if systemic crises unambiguously occur, identifying their starting and ending dates is 
hazardous and the same episode may have a different duration in different studies. Where runs 
do not occur and banking system data are either unavailable or unreliable, locating the exact 
time when the system became insolvent is impossible. Even if runs do occur, this may be a 
culmination of a prolonged period of systemic insolvency, which was either unknown to 
depositors or supported by government assistance at and earlier stage. Based on the run, the 
start date would time the crisis too late.  
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) note that crises can also be dated too early, since the worst of 
the crisis could unfold after the subjective start date. Dating is also problematic when there 
are successions of crises episodes; in many such instances it is arguable that later crises are 
extensions or re-emergences of previous financial distress as opposed to distinct crises events 
(Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996). Judgment is also required to distinguish between periods of 
systemic and non-systemic crisis; a degree of banking system insolvency must be decided 
upon whereby failure of a few banks is recorded as a localised crisis and beyond this crisis 
becomes systemic. Not all studies make this distinction in the same way so that a crisis may 
                                                 
14 The proportion of non-performing loans to total banking system assets exceeded 10%, or the public bailout 
cost exceeded 2% of GDP, or systemic crisis caused large scale bank nationalisation, or extensive bank runs 
were visible and if not, emergency government intervention was visible. 
15 For Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), a crisis is systemic if banks runs result in closure or nationalisation of at 
least one bank, or if there are no runs, large-scale government intervention, merging or nationalisation of one 
bank marks the beginning of the same for other banks. Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) classify systemic crises 
on the basis of whether bank runs, portfolio shifts, bank collapses or large-scale government intervention occur. 
Any other episodes of financial instability are classed as non-systemic crises. 
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be a systemic event in one paper but remain excluded from the banking crisis dummy in 
another.  
 
Whichever crisis definition is used, the crisis duration must be handled carefully in order to 
avoid endogeneity; once a crisis occurs it is likely to deepen any recession and affect the 
explanatory variables. Studies have addressed this feedback in various ways: Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1998) conduct two sets of regressions, one by discarding all observations 
after a crisis begins and another by discarding observations after a crisis has ended16. Others 
have arbitrarily assumed a common duration for all crises, e.g. 18 months (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999) or 1 year (Eichengreen and Arteta, 2000; Glick and Hutchinson, 1999). 
 
The subjectivity associated with banking crisis identification may explain why almost all 
authors have relied on the studies mentioned above, either wholly or in combination, to 
construct their banking crisis variable. The disadvantage of this is that all research has focused 
on a few assessments of crisis occurrence. The advantage is that it reduces multiplicity in the 
dependent variable amongst studies. In this vein, we will also rely on the Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2005) and Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) crises lists. Henceforth we refer to the 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) dates/ dummy as DD05 and the Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003) dates/ dummy as CK03. 
 
2.2 The Data Sample 
 
The dataset of independent variables mimics the Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
approach, utilising most of their variables but for a wider selection of countries and for a 
longer time span. We have used the same data source they cite: IFS and World Bank 
Development Indicators to obtain annual data; full data sources are obtainable in Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998). A maximum of 105 countries are included whilst the data spans 
the period 1979 to 2003. Under the DD05 dating this yields 72 systemic crisis episodes; under 
the less stringent CK03 definitions this yields 102 systemic crisis episodes. Almost half the 
countries included in our full sample experienced no systemic crisis based on DD05 dates, 
whereas under a fifth were non-crisis countries based on the CK03 dates.  
 
As explained in Part 1, the explanatory variables chosen are macroeconomic, financial and 
financial liberalisation indicators of crisis. Table 1 below gives the indicator list. 
                                                 
16 They find the results do not change significantly either way. 
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Table 1: The Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) Variables 
 
1. Real GDP Growth (%)  
2. Change in Terms of Trade (%)  
3. Nominal Depreciation (%) 
4. Real Interest Rate (%) 
5. Inflation (%) 
Macroeconomic Variables 
6. Fiscal Surplus/ GDP (%) 
7. M2/ Foreign Exchange Reserves (%) 
8. Credit to Private Sector/ GDP (%) 
9. Bank Liquid Reserves/ Total Bank Assets (%) Financial Variables 
10. Real Domestic Credit Growth (%) 
11. Real GDP per Capita Institutional Variables 12. Deposit Insurance (binary dummy) 
 
2.3 The Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) Mulivariate Logit Model 
 
The multivariate logit approach allowed Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) to relate the 
likelihood of occurrence or non-occurrence of a banking crisis to a vector of n explanatory 
variables. The probability that the banking dummy takes a value of one (crisis occurs) at a 
point in time is given by the value of the logistic cumulative distribution evaluated for the 
data and parameters at that point in time. Thus, 
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where Yit is the banking crisis dummy for country i at time t, β is the vector of coefficients, 
Xit is the vector of explanatory variables and F(β Xit) is the cumulative logistic distribution. 
The parameters are obtained by maximum likelihood estimation where each possible value of 
Yit contributes to the joint likelihood function so that the log likelihood becomes 
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The parameters obtained by maximising this function are not constant marginal effects of Xi 
on the crisis probability since the underlying relationship is non-linear. Rather, the marginal 
effect of Xit on Yit is given by the probability of crisis times the probability of no crisis times 
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the coefficient βi17. Since the probabilities depend on the values of Xit, for a given coefficient, 
a single explanatory variable can have changing marginal contributions to crisis probability 
depending on its starting level. The sigmoidal logistic cumulative distribution shows that an 
explanatory variable will make marginally little difference to crisis if the crisis probability is 
already at the extreme (low or high) but if crisis probability is around the 0.5 range then a 
change in the same variable is more likely to tip the balance and trigger crisis18. The sign on 
the coefficient still indicates the direction of change on crisis probability. To directly compare 
the individual contributions of each variable to crisis, their marginal effects can be computed 
for their mean values (Greene, 2000) or at a specific year before a crisis unfolds. 
 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) do not use a fixed effects logit model; a fixed effects 
model would mean the country specific dummy and the banking crisis dummy would be 
perfectly correlated for countries which never experienced a banking crisis. Excluding these 
countries would generate a biased sample and biased coefficients. Rather, they use a sample 
composed of crisis and non-crisis countries where the latter represent controls. In this way, 
variation in the explanatory variables is fully used to explain why crisis will or will not occur.  
 
The advantage of this parametric approach is that it takes into account the interdependencies 
of explanatory variables which in combination could trigger crisis. In this sense, the model 
corresponds to much of the theory outlined in Part 1 where concurrent increases in real 
interest rates, GDP and credit growth in the presence of financial liberalisation seem to 
predispose economies to crisis.  
 
2.4 The Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) Signal Extraction Model 
 
This is a non-parametric approach which assesses the behaviour of single variables prior to 
and during crisis episodes. The logic is that if aberrant behaviour of a variable can be 
quantitatively defined then whenever that variable moves from tranquil to abnormal activity, 
crisis is forewarned. Let 
 
i = a univariate indicator  
                                                 
17 The probit model is also equally valid for the banking crisis context; in this case the normal distribution 
underlies the likelihood function and the marginal effects are given by the variables contribution to crisis. 
probability times the coefficient. Multivariate probit has been used by Eichengreen and Rose (1998) and Glick 
and Hutchison (1999) amongst others. 
18 Conversely, an improvement in the variable could cause a significant marginal reduction in crisis probability. 
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j = a particular country 
S= signal variable 
X = indicator 
 
An indicator variable relating to indicator i and country j is denoted by Xij and the threshold 
for this indicator is denoted as X*ij A signal variable relating to indicator i and country j is 
denoted by: S ij . This is constructed to be a binary variable where S ij = {0,1}. If the variable 
crosses the threshold, a signal is emitted and S ij = 1. This happens when 
 
  { S ij = 1 } = { │ Xij │ > │ X*ij │ }  ..(3) 
 
If the indicator remains within its threshold boundary, it behaves normally and does not issue 
a signal so S ij = 0,  
  { S ij = 0 } = { │ Xij │ < │ X*ij │ }  ..(4)  
 
Hence in a global EWS, panel data is used to derive a threshold for each variable, which 
distinguishes between normal and aberrant behaviour. Notice the directional sign may vary 
depending on whether the indicator in question has an upper or lower bound; hence the 
variables and thresholds in equations (3) and (4) are expressed in absolute terms. Thus for a 
time series of t observations for country j and indicator i we can obtain a binary time series of 
signal or no-signal observations. This series is then checked against actual events to construct 
a measure of predictive accuracy. There are four possible scenarios: 
 
 CRISIS NO CRISIS 
SI
G
N
A
L 
A B 
N
O
 
SI
G
N
A
L 
C D 
 
If the indicator signals crisis and this correlates with an actual crisis, the outcome is denoted 
A. If the signal is not matched by a crisis in reality, the outcome is denoted B. If no signal 
is emitted by the indicator but there was an actual crisis, the outcome is called C. If no 
signal is emitted and there really is no crisis, the outcome is D. 
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Hence a perfect indicator would produce outcomes A and D only; it would correctly call all 
crises and would not issue signals unnecessarily. Outcome C represents a failure to call crisis 
(Type I error) and outcome B generates a false alarm (Type II error). Hence a measure of 
signalling accuracy can be constructed for each indicator, based on the proportion of false 
alarms and missed crises; there are various criteria (e.g. minimise Type I error only) so the 
chosen measure will reflect the desires of the policy maker or private institution using the 
EWS. This is based on the inherent trade-off between Type I and Type II errors which are 
functions of the threshold; changing the threshold to allow more crises to be picked up 
necessarily raises the likelihood of false alarms. A policy maker concerned with avoiding 
crises at all costs may choose to minimise Type I errors even if this entails unnecessary 
intervention (or at least, investigation) due to more Type II errors. Likewise, in currency crisis 
models, private sector investors with positions entailing a large amount of exchange rate risk 
may prefer wider thresholds giving them time to take alternative investment positions. On the 
other hand, policy makers with relatively stable financial systems may prefer avoiding Type II 
errors and undue intervention.  
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) choose to minimise the probability of failing to call crisis and 
the probability of false alarms simultaneously. Specifically, the Noise to Signal Ratio 
(henceforth NTSR) is given by (Type II error/ 1  Type I error). As with normal hypothesis 
testing, changing the threshold to reduce Type I errors necessarily increases the number of 
Type II errors. The NTSR measure takes this trade-off into account; the optimal threshold will 
minimise the numerator and maximise the denominator of the NTSR. Different percentiles of 
the entire panel (i.e. cross-country) series are taken as thresholds and the corresponding NTSR 
is evaluated. The percentile that minimises the NTSR is selected and applied to each country 
to produce a country specific threshold which forms the benchmark for the EWS. The 
advantage of this non-parametric approach is that it focuses on a particular variables 
association with crisis and that it can be based on high frequency data.  
 
3 Results 
 
3.1 Replication of Demirguc Kunt and Detragiache (2005)(denoted DD05) 
 
Following the DD05 procedure, regressions were conducted with three sets of explanatory 
variables: macroeconomic only (minus fiscal), macroeconomic (minus fiscal) with financial, 
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macroeconomic with financial and institutional. Tables 2-5 show our results against the 
benchmark DD05 results. We also report the models Akaikes Information Criterion and the 
Wald test statistic which tests the null that all coefficients equal zero. 
 
Table 2: Regression 1: Macroeconomic (minus fiscal) Variables Only 
 Original Replication 
D&D (2005) Paper D&D (2005) crisis dummy 
C&K (2003) 
crisis dummy 
 
  (1980  2002) 
94 countries, 
77 crisis 
occurrences (1st 
crisis year only) 
 
(1979  2003) 
105 countries, 72 
crisis 
occurrences(1st 
crisis year only) 
 
      (1979  2003) 
105 countries, 
121 crisis occurrences 
(1st crisis year only) 
 
 
Real GDP Growth -0.0967
*** 
(0.0259) 
-0.1693*** 
(0.0332) 
-0.1177*** 
(0.0240) 
Change in Terms of Trade 0.0005 (0.0061) 
-0.0285*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0191*** 
(0.0016) 
Depreciation -0.0675 (0.3892) 
0.0000 
(0.0011) 
0.0000 
(0.0003) 
Real Interest Rate 0.0006
*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0243** 
(0.0108) 
0.0416* 
(0.0242) 
Inflation 0.0007
** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0012 
(0.0000) 
0.0010 
(0.0006) 
Real GDP per Capita -0.0367
* 
(0.0156) 
-0.0347* 
(0.0196) 
 
-0.0391*** 
(0.0139) 
Fiscal Balance/ GDP X X X 
M2/ International Reserves X X X 
Private Credit/ GDP X X X 
Deposit Insurance X X X 
Credit Growth (-2) X X X 
Wald Test Statistic  412.67*** 264.01
*** 
 
AIC 593 0.3102 0.5084 
Observations 1670 1314 1491 
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, standard errors in 
parenthesis.  indicates a coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to overcome scaling 
issues. 
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Table 3: Regression 2: Macroeconomic (minus fiscal) and Financial Variables 
 Original Replication 
D&D (2005) Paper D&D (2005) crisis dummy 
C&K (2003) crisis 
dummy 
 
(1980  2002) 
94 countries, 
75 crisis 
occurrences 
(1st crisis year only) 
 
(1979  2003) 
105 countries, 42 
crisis occurrences (1st 
crisis year only) 
 
(1979  2003) 
105 countries, 
77 crisis occurrences 
(1st crisis year only) 
 
 
Real GDP Growth -0.0991
*** 
(0.0265) 
-0.1964*** 
(0.0362) 
-0.1368*** 
(0.0273) 
Change in Terms of Trade 0.0006 (0.0064) 
-0.0273*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0193*** 
(0.0018) 
Depreciation 0.0713 (0.3830) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
0.0000 
(0.0003) 
Real Interest Rate 0.0005
*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0268** 
(0.0122) 
0.0293 
(0.0275) 
Inflation 0.0006
** 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0012) 
0.0009 
(0.0007) 
Real GDP per Capita -0.0359
** 
(0.0168) 
0.0000 
(0.1718) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Fiscal Balance/ GDP X X X 
M2/ International Reserves 0.0012
* 
(0.0007) 
0.0000 
(0.0003) 
-0.0008 
(0.0018) 
Private Credit/ GDP 0.0010
*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0006 
(0.0010) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
Credit Growth (-2) 0.0038
** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0005 
(0.0009) 
0.0005 
(0.0010) 
Deposit Insurance X X X 
Wald Test Statistic  355.24*** 365.05*** 
AIC 579 0.3200 0.5323 
Observations 1612 1153 1327 
 
 18
Table 4: Regression 3: Macroeconomic, Financial and Fiscal Variables. 
 
 Original Replication 
D&D (2005) Paper D&D (2005) crisis dummy 
C&K (2003) 
crisis dummy 
 
(1980  2002) 
94 countries, 
65 crisis occurrences 
(1st crisis year only) 
 
(1979  2003) 
105 countries, 42 crisis 
occurrences (1st crisis year 
only) 
 
(1979  2003) 
105 countries, 
70 crisis occurrences 
(1st crisis year only) 
 
Real GDP Growth -0.1115
*** 
(0.0319) 
-0.1891*** 
(0.0402) 
-0.1677*** 
(0.0338) 
 
Change in Terms of 
Trade 
-0.0024 
(0.0066) 
-0.0288*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0150*** 
(0.0028) 
Depreciation -0.1037 (0.3918) 
0.0000 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
 
Real Interest Rate 0.0005
*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0313** 
(0.0128) 
0.0034 
(0.0138) 
 
Inflation 0.0007
** 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0014) 
-0.0161 
(0.0102) 
 
Real GDP per Capita -0.0414
** 
(0.0175) 
-0.0275 
(0.0215) 
-0.0303** 
(0.0147) 
 
Fiscal Balance/ GDP 0.0033
** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0498 
(0.0348) 
0.0402 
(0.0314) 
 
M2/ International 
Reserves 
0.0062*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0000 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0004) 
 
Private Credit/ GDP 0.0016
*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0007 
(0.0010) 
0.0000 
(0.0001) 
 
Credit Growth (-2) 0.0044
* 
(0.0023) 
-0.0004 
(0.0010) 
-0.0117** 
(0.0048) 
 
Deposit Insurance X X X 
Wald Test Statistic  293.58
*** 
 311.31
*** 
AIC 494 0.3306 0.5276 
Observations 1612 1153 1327 
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Table 5: Regression 4: All Variables 
 
 
 
These regressions (Tables 2-5) show that real GDP growth, real interest rates and real GDP 
per capita are consistently and significantly associated with crisis. These results are consistent 
with the DD05 findings. However in our case, adding many of the financial variables makes 
little difference to the model (the coefficients are not significant) and actually reduce the AIC. 
This is in contrast to DD05 who found that increased budget deficits and private credit/ GDP 
raised banking crisis probability. 
 Original Replication 
D&D (2005) Paper D&D (2005) crisis dummy 
C&K (2003) crisis 
dummy 
 
(1980  2002) 
94 countries, 
77 crisis 
occurrences 
(1st crisis year only) 
 
(1979  2003) 
105 countries, 38 
crisis occurrences (1st 
crisis year only) 
 
(1979  2003) 
105 countries, 
61 crisis occurrences 
(1st crisis year only) 
 
 
Real GDP Growth 
 
-0.1175*** 
(0.0332) 
-0.1925*** 
(0.0405) 
-0.1706*** 
(0.0340) 
 
Change in Terms of Trade -0.0028 (0.0067) 
-0.0302*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.0159*** 
(0.0030) 
 
 
Depreciation -0.1233 (0.3946) 
0.0000 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
 
Real Interest Rate 0.0006
*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0314** 
(0.0131) 
0.0009 
(0.0145) 
 
Inflation 0.0007 (0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0013) 
-0.0172* 
(0.0105) 
 
Real GDP per Capita -0.0544
*** 
(0.0184) 
-0.0318 
(0.0220) 
-0.0349** 
(0.0154) 
 
Fiscal Balance/ GDP 0.0014
** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0496 
(0.0352) 
0.0440 
(0.0318) 
 
M2/ International Reserves 0.0066
*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0000 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0005) 
Private Credit/ GDP 0.0012
*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0008 
(0.0011) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
 
Credit Growth (-2) 0.0041
* 
(0.0022) 
-0.0005 
(0.0011) 
-0.0120*** 
(0.0049) 
 
Deposit Insurance 0.5859
** 
(0.2786) 
0.3477 
(0.3607) 
0.3549 
(0.2942) 
 
Wald Test Statistic  291.06*** 416.11*** 
AIC 493 0.3318 0.5283 
Observations 1356 952 1094 
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In regression 3, we find inflation may have a weak negative effect on banking crisis which 
may reflect procyclical behaviour of asset prices, since during booms, crises are less likely. 
The fact that higher real GDP growth is consistently found to reduce banking crisis 
probability confirms it is a robust leading indicator of banking crisis. Apart from directly 
reducing non-performing loans (and concurrently credit risk), GDP growth may also delay 
banking crises, again due to procylicality. The coefficients on real interest rates are positive 
and apart from one regression, significant. This suggests interest rate risk materialisation and 
financial liberalisation could trigger crises. However the effect of interest rates is not robust to 
the banking crisis dummy used; alongside the Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) (CK03) dummy, 
interest rates become insignificant. One explanation may the less stringent crisis criteria CK03 
use to classify systemic episodes in comparison to DD05. The DD05 crises are more likely to 
be fully systemic implying that real interest rates may become a more important trigger if 
financial instability is endemic as opposed to more localised insolvency. Lagged real credit 
growth is negatively significant in one specification and insignificant in others whereas DD05 
found this variable to be significant albeit in one model specification only. Similarly they 
found domestic credit/ GDP to be positively associated with crisis, but this variable was not 
significant in any of our initial regressions. 
 
In contrast to DD05, we find that positive terms of trade shocks consistently reduce banking 
crisis probability. This may be due to the higher number of small open economies in our 
sample compared to DD05. Apart from the direct effects on increased loan repayments, 
favourable terms of trade are also likely to reduce chances of currency crisis. As Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999) show, once a banking crisis is underway, the onset of a currency crisis is 
likely to deepen banking difficulties. 
 
The Wald test statistics show the coefficients are all significantly different from zero. On the 
basis of the AIC it appears the most parsimonious model (regression 1) is the best 
specification of the four regressions. However the changing signs on the coefficients and the 
insignificance of many variables which DD05 found to be significant indicate the 
specification may be improved.  
 
3.2 Improving the Model: Transforming Variables 
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Following the first set of regressions, we experimented with data transformations and lags to 
accommodate the dynamics of banking crises. Furthermore, the occurrence of a banking crisis 
leaves the economy vulnerable to further crises and may explain the successive crisis episodes 
observed in many economies. Omitting observations following crisis onset as in DD05 
removes this vulnerability from the data. Hence we repeat the regressions retaining all 
observations.  
 
DD05 do not mention heterogeneity of series but inspection of the data shows significant 
differences in the magnitude of variables within countries (i.e. between growth and level 
variables) and between countries. Accordingly, we standardise each series and log several 
variables (other series have been checked for stationarity). The standardising process involves 
dividing the deviation of each observation from the pooled mean by the pooled standard 
deviation, )(var/)( ,
*
, XXXX titi −= , where tiX , is the observation for country i at time t, X is 
the pooled mean and )(var X  is the pooled standard deviation. We remove depreciation since 
it is correlated with terms of trade and it was insignificant in the DD05 regressions. Also we 
assess for lags in a number of variables, the chosen lags were found from a grid search. Note 
in particular that credit growth and deposit insurance take quite long lags prior to the crisis, as 
is plausible (i.e. a crisis may be several years after the credit booms peak, while deposit 
insurance takes time to affect risk-taking behaviour). 
Tables 6 shows that more indicators now appear as significant predictors of crisis and more 
leading indicators appear robust to the banking dummy specification. Note however that the 
lags chosen have also reduced the number of observations compared with Table 5. 
 
Standardising the variables and taking logs where necessary improves significance on many 
variables. This suggests that without a fixed effects model, unless data is restricted to a 
homogenous country set, some form of adjustment may be necessary to accommodate 
variation in the data. This allows a wider cross-country sample to underpin the EWS. We first 
discuss the overall significance of the explanatory variables following their transformation 
before explaining why we have selected the lags we have and discussing their significance in 
the context of banking crisis dynamics in section 3.3.  
 
Real GDP growth remains robustly significantly inversely related to crisis, whichever banking 
crisis definition used. High real interest rates now appear to significantly increase the 
probability of banking crisis in accordance with DD05. Moreover, the size of the coefficient 
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implies the interest rate risk effect is much stronger in our model. A rise in inflation 
substantially increases the chances of crises. Unlike DD05, who did not find this variable to 
be significant, we find the inflation coefficient to be the largest of all. A healthy fiscal surplus 
seems to signal authorities general ability to manage policy in a positive sense and their 
ability to intervene in the banking system if necessary, which reduces crisis likelihood. The 
significance of this variable increases under our specification compared to DD05. Conversely, 
the positive coefficient on M2/ Reserves shows an increase in un-backed money adds to the 
chances of capital flight and thus to the probability of a pure banking or twin crisis. This 
coefficient was insignificant in our previous specifications.  
 
Table 6: Regression 5: All Variables: Standardisation, More Lags and Logs Introduced 
D&D (2005) crisis 
dummy 
C&K (2003) crisis 
dummy 
 (1979  2003) 105 countries, 46 crisis 
observations (all years) 
 
(1979  2003) 
105 countries, 
81 crisis observations 
(all crisis years) 
 
 
Log (Real GDP Growth(-2)) -0.4026
*** 
(0.1443) 
-0.2978*** 
(0.1214) 
Change in Terms of Trade 0.0001 (0.0036) 
0.0007 
(0.0026) 
Real Interest Rate (-2) 0.5729
* 
(0.3499) 
-0.0354 
(0.2851) 
Inflation 17.1924
*** 
(4.5638) 
3.4592 
(3.8379) 
Change in Real GDP per Capita -16.6447
** 
(6.9907) 
-16.5295*** 
(5.2466) 
Fiscal Balance/ GDP -0.1711
*** 
(0.0525) 
-0.1238*** 
(0.0417) 
M2/ International Reserves 2.7189
** 
(1.3164) 
1.9731 
(1.3653) 
Log (Private Credit/ GDP)  -0.4394
*** 
(0.1208) 
-0.3802*** 
(0.1007) 
Credit Growth (-5) 4.2305
** 
(2.0514) 
-0.1574 
(0.2362) 
Deposit Insurance (-10) 0.5755
* 
(0.3555) 
0.1412 
(0.2700) 
Wald Test Statistic 113.27*** 97.03*** 
AIC 0.6417 0.9564 
Observations 368 368 
 
The negative sign on the private credit/ GDP coefficient indicates that crises are more likely 
in lesser-developed economies where bank intermediation is the main mechanism of raising 
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capital and regulation may be of lower quality. The coefficient on credit growth supports the 
theory that accumulations in credit risk are a cause of banking crises. The safety net of deposit 
insurance significantly raises the likelihood of morally hazardous lending by banks, which 
adds to the crisis probability. Again, this effect appears to be much stronger under our 
specification compared to DD05. The coefficient on the change in GDP per capita is strongly 
negative and significant, indicating that improvements in institutional quality associated with 
higher GDP reduce banking crisis risk. 
 
Whilst the above results seem entirely consistent with banking crisis theory, they are not 
entirely robust to the choice of baking crisis dummy. Nevertheless, some variables which 
were insignificant alongside the CK03 definitions when untransformed data was used 
(regressions 1-4) now appear significant under both dummy definitions: fiscal balance/ GDP 
and private credit/ GDP. The significance of real GDP per capita now increases for the CK03 
dummy in comparison to when data is not standardised. On the other hand, when the CK03 
definitions of crisis are used, inflation and credit growth are less significant.  
 
Under the new specification with lags introduced, terms of trade loses significance for both 
crisis definitions. This may imply that terms of trade shocks play little part in the 
accumulation of systemic risk, but that (as regression 1-4 show), once risk is amassed 
systemically, a sudden deterioration in an economys terms of trade could precipitate a 
banking crisis.  
 
3.3 Improving the Model Further: Investigating Dynamics. 
  
To model the dynamics of banking crises, we now introduce further lags and several 
interaction variables so that we use the data to mimic the procyclical build up of risk. Our 
banking crisis story unfolds as follows: credit booms are more likely to occur in an 
environment which allows imprudent lending, such as following the adoption of deposit 
insurance. Hence, after deposit insurance is introduced we expect to see rises in domestic 
credit growth being associated with imprudent lending. This may be tempered if agents are 
not so reliant on bank intermediation for funds when deposit insurance is installed. To test the 
impact of credit growth in the presence of deposit insurance, we interact credit growth and 
deposit insurance at different lags. The results in table 7 clearly show the procyclical 
behaviour of credit growth. During the boom phase up to four years prior to crisis, credit 
growth appears to generate credit risk. From three years prior to crisis, a cyclical downturn 
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seems to occur with the coefficient sign switching so that credit rationing increases the 
likelihood of crisis. The fact that the interaction terms are significant (with credit growth 
alone insignificant) also demonstrates how moral hazard is more prevalent when deposit 
insurance exists so that credit booms generate considerable banking crisis risk.  
 
Table 7: Regression 6: Procyclicality and Moral Hazard 
D&D (2005) crisis 
dummy 
C&K (2003) crisis 
dummy 
 (1979  2003) 
105 countries, 
70crisis observations 
(all years) 
(1979  2003) 
105 countries, 
100 crisis observations 
(all years) 
 
Log (Real GDP Growth) 
-0.1152 
(0.1204) 
-0.1329 
(0.1083) 
Change in Terms of Trade 
0.0013 
(0.0031) 
0.0009 
(0.0027) 
Real Interest Rate 
0.0030 
(0.3013) 
0.0506 
(0.2821) 
Inflation 
5.6593** 
(2.7485) 
-1.6839 
(2.9102) 
Change in Real GDP per Capita 
-18.6873*** 
(6.9503) 
-18.7623*** 
(5.9710) 
Fiscal Balance/ GDP 
-0.0466 
(0.0361) 
-0.0843*** 
(0.0334) 
M2/ International Reserves 
12.5815*** 
(4.7478) 
5.4025** 
(2.7862) 
Log (Private Credit/ GDP) 
-0.2319** 
(0.1037) 
-0.3905*** 
(0.0941) 
Credit Growth*Insurance 
-6.2798* 
(3.5159) 
-8.3398** 
(3.6856) 
Credit Growth*Insurance(-1) 
-10.9812*** 
(4.2393) 
-9.2458*** 
(3.7538) 
Credit Growth*Insurance(-2) 
-8.1842** 
(4.1300) 
-8.5824** 
(3.7562) 
Credit Growth*Insurance(-3) 
-2.7540 
(2.8714) 
0.7778 
(3.0085) 
Credit Growth*Insurance(-4) 
6.4430** 
(3.1518) 
4.6280 
(3.0500) 
Credit Growth*Insurance(-5) 
7.9458*** 
(3.1063) 
4.7191* 
(2.8103) 
Credit Growth(-1) 
-1.3292 
(2.5000) 
2.4400 
(2.3468) 
Credit Growth(-2) 
2.3022 
(2.7396) 
4.9375* 
(2.6044) 
Credit Growth(-3) 
0.1518 
(1.4265) 
-1.9288 
(1.6528) 
Credit Growth(-4) 
-0.0899 
(0.2471) 
-0.3865 
(0.3933) 
Credit Growth(-5) 
-0.0729 
(0.1235) 
-0.0251* 
(0.0846) 
AIC 0.7089 0.8722 
Wald Statistic 156.07*** 1.35*** 
Observations 484 484 
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3.3 In Sample Predictive Ability 
 
We now turn to see the relative performances of the different specifications in terms of their 
ability to accurately call crises and non-crises episodes. It should be noted that the higher the 
probability threshold set for calling a crisis, the higher the probability of Type I errors (failure 
to call crisis) and the lower the probability of Type II errors (false alarm). In this regard, we 
initially set our threshold much higher than Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) who set 
their cut off probability at 0.0519. In contrast we set our threshold at 0.5, arguing that from the 
policy makers perspective, costly intervention on the basis of a crude EWS should be 
avoided unless the model seriously calls a crisis (table 8a). However the threshold can be 
changed according to a policy makers loss function; those that observe a higher historic crisis 
frequency or who wish to avoid potential crisis at all costs can lower the cut off probability. 
Accordingly we re-estimate in sample predictions using a cut-off probability of 0.05 identical 
to Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). When we reduce our threshold to the Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998) level, our models, notably regressions 5 and 6 have dramatically 
higher crisis predictive ability (table 8b).  
 
Table 8a: In Sample Predictive Ability: Cut-Off Probability = 0.5 
 
Regression 1 2 3 
Our Version    Our Version Our Version Probability 
cut-off = 0.5 DD05* DD05 CK03 DD05* DD05 CK03 DD05* DD05 CK03 
% 
crises correct 60 7 13 60 8 15 58 10 9 
% 
no crises 
correct 
67 96 92 70 96 92 70 96 94 
% 
total correct 67 93 87 70 93 87 70 92 89 
Regression 4 5  6 
Our Version Our Version Our Version Probability 
cut-off = 0.5 DD05* DD05 CK03 DD05* DD05 CK03 DD05* DD05 CK05 
% 
crises correct 62 10 5 NA 31 34 NA 34 28 
% 
no crises 
correct 
68 96 95 NA 90 80 NA 98 96 
% 
total correct 68 92 89 NA 82 70 NA 89 82 
* For DD05 cut-off probability is 0.05 
 
                                                 
19 They decide this threshold on the basis of the frequency of crisis episodes in their sample. 
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Table 8b: In Sample Predictive Ability: Cut-Off Probability = 0.05 
 
Regression 1 2 3 
Our Version    Our Version Our Version Probability 
cut-off = 0.05 DD05 DD05 CK03 DD05 DD05 CK03 DD05 DD05 CK03 
% 
crises correct 60 53 66 60 54 66 58 66 66 
% 
no crises 
correct 
67 78 50 70 78 34 70 76 48 
% 
total correct 67 77 51 70 78 50 70 75 49 
Regression 4 5  6 
Our Version Our Version Our Version Probability 
cut-off = 0.05 DD05 DD05 CK03 DD05 DD05 CK03 DD05 DD05 CK05 
% 
crises correct 62 66 66 NA 91 99 NA 91 99 
% 
no crises 
correct 
68 77 45 NA 44 12 NA 32 23 
% 
total correct 68 76 50 NA 50 31 NA 40 39 
 
Table 8(a) shows that with a cut-off probability of 0.5, our models are better at calling non-
crisis periods correctly although the ability to call crisis episodes is substantially lower than 
DD05. This is as we would expect given the trade-off between Type I and Type II errors and 
the higher cut-off. However once we lower the threshold to the same level as DD05 at 0.05,  
our models out-perform the DD05 models in terms of crisis prediction (apart from regressions 
1 and 2). This is independent of the crisis dummy used. Moreover, a dynamic model such as 
Model 5 is notably better at predicting crisis events with above 90% of crisis episodes being 
called correctly.  
 
Both tables also show that given the same threshold, the CK03 crisis dummy generally is 
better predicted by these variables that the DD05 dummy. This may be due to the wider 
definitions of crisis that CK03 use so that the CK03 dummy is associated with a reduced 
ability to call non-crisis periods correctly and therefore a higher chance of Type II errors.  
Table 8b shows our models do not appear to lose much in terms of Type II errors when the 
cut-off probability is lowered to 0.05 since based on the DD05 dummy, our % of non-crisis 
events correctly predicted is marginally higher than the DD05 models. As a result, our models 
consistently outperform the DD05 models in term of total correct predictions but only if the 
DD05 dummy is used. If the CK03 dummy is used, our models underperform in total; again 
this is probably due to the wider crisis definitions of the CK03 dummy which results in 
reduced ability to identify non-crisis periods. 
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Overall these results that incorporating dynamics substantially improves crisis predictive 
ability with no significant cost in terms of false alarms. It also illustrates the tradeoff of Type I 
and Type II errors in logit models. 
 
3.4 Banking crisis prediction using the method of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
 
Using exactly the same dataset as the previous logit regressions, we now conduct a signal 
extraction approach in the manner of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), henceforth KR9920. The 
KR99 methodology locates the optimal threshold using a common percentile for the cross-
country distribution of each variable. Whilst we will adopt this approach, we also argue that 
minimisation of a common percentile may be problematic. If the 20th percentile is chosen as 
the optimal threshold across all cross-sections, this is equivalent to the notion that whenever 
real GDP growth falls into the lowest 20% of observations in any country, a crisis is 
imminent. Whilst for some countries during some time periods this may be reasonably 
correct, for other countries it may not; certain countries may undergo structural changes (e.g. 
financial liberalisation, move from recession to boom) which generate different distributions 
for the indicator and their optimal threshold may differ accordingly. Hence generalisation to a 
common percentile threshold may limit the predictive ability of panel based EWS. 
Accordingly we test whether country specific and general grid searches give rise to different 
optimal thresholds. We then compare the in-sample predictive ability of the two approaches. 
 
To optimise thresholds on the basis of country specific data we compute the NTSR for each 
country using a selection of percentiles. We use a forecasting horizon of two years  one year 
prior to the crisis and the crisis year itself. Our horizon is considerably more stringent than the 
KR99 signalling window which consists of 54 months (18 months before the crisis, an 18 
month crisis episode and 18 months after the crisis). We choose a shorter signalling window 
because where there are multiple crisis episodes, signalling windows may overlap. Also, 
because we use annual data, our signalling window is restricted to yearly increments. The 
lowest NTSR given by the threshold corresponding to each country is then aggregated into a 
common threshold. Table 9 and Graphs 1-8 show our optimal thresholds (in terms of 
percentiles) and the corresponding correct predictions, where General refers to the common 
percentile approach used by KR99. 
                                                 
20 We therefore abandon the KR99 variable list which is more focused on detecting balance of payments 
difficulties. 
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Graph 1: REAL GDP GROWTH 
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Graph 2: TERMS OF TRADE 
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Graph 3: REAL INTEREST RATE 
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Graph 4: DEPRECIATION 
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Graph 5: INFLATION 
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Graph 6: BUDGET BALANCE 
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                Graph 7: M2 / RESERVES 
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  Graph 8: CREDIT / GDP RATIO 
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Table 9: Comparison of In-Sample Predictive Ability for General and Country Specific 
Thresholds. 
 
 Real GDP Growth Terms of Trade 
 Country Specific General Country Specific General 
Optimal Percentile 8 4 10 8 
NTSR 0.5904 0.2701 0.7370 1.0284 
% crisis correct 12 10 15 7 
% no crisis correct 93 97 89 93 
% total correct 81 84 76 78 
 Real Interest Rate Depreciation 
 Country Specific General Country Specific General 
Optimal Percentile 4.5 1 4 2.5 
NTSR 1.0917 0.4309 0.5667 0.1436 
% crisis correct 7 2 6 1 
% no crisis correct 92 99 96 100 
% total correct 80 85 82 84 
 Inflation Budget Surplus 
 Country Specific General Country Specific General 
Optimal Percentile 6 4 6 4 
NTSR 0.9373 0.5509 0.7113 0.8084 
% crisis correct 9 6 12 4 
% no crisis correct 92 97 91 97 
% total correct 79 83 79 82 
 M2/ Reserves Credit/ GDP 
 Country Specific General Country Specific General 
Optimal Percentile 20 1 8 2 
NTSR 0.8598 0.3246 1.1318 0.4251 
% crisis correct 23 2 8 4 
% no crisis correct 80 99 91 98 
% total correct 71 84 78 83 
 
 
The results show there is a big difference between country specific and general thresholds and 
that as a result, the optimal percentile differs widely. Using a country specific optimisation 
procedure results in a higher percentage of crises being predicted compared to the generalised 
threshold method. However, the general threshold procedure is better at calling non-crisis 
episodes, so that there are a higher chance of Type I errors with the general method and 
conversely, a higher chance of Type II errors with the specific method. Given that there is a 
high ratio of non-crisis to crisis observations in the sample, overall the general procedure 
performs better in terms of total correct predictions. As a result, the general threshold virtually 
always gives a lower NTSR to the specific threshold where values below one indicate the 
variables are informative. 
 
In terms of individual leading indicator performance, the best predictors of crisis appear to be 
real GDP growth and changes in the terms of trade. This is consistent with the panel logit 
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results. M2/ reserves and budget surpluses are also better than other indicators at calling 
crises.  
 
Although we follow the Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) procedure, we are unable to compare 
most of our indicator performances with theirs since they conducted their estimations for a 
different sample of countries and different time frames, using mostly different indicators on a 
monthly basis21. However  comparison of indicators common to our study and theirs (real 
interest rates and domestic credit/ GDP) shows our indicators are considerably worse at 
calling banking crises correctly compared to theirs. For Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), real 
interest rates are able to call 100% of crises correctly whilst domestic credit/ GDP is able to 
call 50% of crises correctly. However the authors do not mention their indicators ability to 
call non-crisis periods correctly or the level of Type II errors that arise with such high 
prediction rates. 
 
Overall our results suggest there may be policy implications for the selection of the 
optimisation procedure. Policy makers who place emphasis on crisis avoidance may utilise 
the country specific approach. However the results also imply that a country specific signal 
extraction model, where thresholds are derived from historic data for a single country is more 
likely to incorporate more information when selecting the optimal threshold. Much of this 
heterogeneity is averaged away when deriving global thresholds. We next turn to investigate 
whether combining indicators changes the trade off between Type I and Type II indicators for 
our dataset. 
 
3.5 Furthering the Signal Extraction Approach: Composite Indicators 
 
 Borio and Lowe (2002) developed the Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) procedure by 
constructing composite indicators22 to extract signals of banking crisis. Their approach is to 
select indicators which a priori are thought to contain information for banking crisis 
prediction. They then aggregate these variables to generate a composite signal whereby the 
indicator is switched on if all constituent variables cross their respective thresholds 
simultaneously. Selection of optimal composite thresholds is achieved by a grid search to 
                                                 
21 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) base their study on 20 small open economies with a fixed exchange rate or a 
crawling peg over a period 1970-1995. Their sample contained 26 banking crises, 19 of which were twinned. 
Because they were investigating balance of payments crises as well as twin crises, the variables they used were 
predominantly different to ours which are based on the DD05 study. 
22 They actually focus on the accumulation of risk by integrating different variables departures from trend into 
one composite variable. 
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identify the minimum NTSR. However, the noteworthy difference to the KR99 approach is 
that the Borio and Lowe (2002) method implicitly gives more weight to Type II errors, since 
they consider the failure to predict crises outweighs the costs of unnecessary intervention. 
Their more stringent requirement that all individual indicators in the composite must cross 
their thresholds for the composite to signal, means when a crisis is called it is more likely to 
happen; the probability of a Type I error is reduced at the cost of higher levels of Type II 
errors.  
 
In this section we also generate composite indicators but our method differs from Borio and 
Lowe (2002). We do not impose a requirement that all indicators within the composite must 
cross their thresholds for the composite to signal. Rather, we construct a composite indicator 
in the manner of Kaminsky (1999) which may signal crisis even if some of the individual 
indicators have not crossed their thresholds. Although we do not assign any weights to Type I 
or II errors, we do construct composites based on the general and specific methodologies 
followed in section 3.4. Since these two approaches have been shown to favour Type I and 
Type II errors differently, we wish to see if this behaviour persists when we construct 
composites. We also investigate whether creating composite indicators affects the 
informational content of the indicator. 
 
Kaminsky (1999) constructs the composite (C) by weighting each component variable by the 
inverse of its noise to signal ratio (equation 5), where tjS is the signal for variable j at time t 
and jω  is the noise to signal ratio for variable j. 
                                   ∑
=
=
T
1t
j
t
jSC
ω
(5) 
 
The Kaminsky (1999) criterion for inclusion in the composite is that the variable must 
generate a noise to signal ratio of less than one since this implies the variable contains a 
higher proportion of information than noise. In our case, we set stronger criteria; we first 
construct a composite indicator using variables that have a noise to signal ratio of 0.5 or less 
and then we construct composites using variables where the ratio is 0.75 or less. Table 10 lists 
the indicators that qualify for each composite; for the 0.5 cut-off, none of the variables qualify 
using the country specific approach and we are left with a composite based on the general 
threshold approach. For the 0.75 cut-off we construct two composites based on the general 
and country specific approaches.  
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Table 10: Variables Qualifying for the Composite Indicator 
0.5 NTSR cut-off 0.75 NTSR cut-off 
General General Country Specific 
Real GDP Growth Real GDP Growth Real GDP Growth 
Real Interest Rate Real Interest Rate Terms of Trade 
Depreciation Depreciation Depreciation 
M2/ Reserves M2/ Reserves Budget Balance 
Domestic Credit/ 
GDP 
Domestic Credit/ 
GDP  
 Inflation  
 
Table 11 and Graph 9 show the results for the general and specific approaches based on the 
different cut-offs for the NTSRs. In section 3.4 we showed the trade-off between Type I and II 
errors when selecting between the general and country specific threshold approach, where the 
general (specific) approach reduced Type II errors (Type I errors) at the cost of higher Type I 
(Type II) errors. A comparison of the general and specific methods for the composite indicator 
based on the NTSR ≤ 0.75 shows that this trade-off persists even if composite indicators are 
constructed. Hence the general approach continues to weight Type II errors more heavily 
whilst the specific approach remains better for policy makers wishing to avoid unnecessary 
intervention costs. 
 
In terms of percentage of crises correctly called, both composites based on the general 
approach outperform six of the eight indicators used in section 3.4. On the other hand, the 
ability to call non-crisis periods correctly is drastically reduced since the general composite 
underperforms against seven of the eight indicators. Similarly, the composite based on the 
country specific method outperforms six of the single variables at calling crises but 
underperforms all except one in its ability to call non-crisis periods correctly.  
 
The composite method therefore appears to improve crisis prediction whether a country 
specific or general threshold approach is used but this occurs at the cost of higher Type II 
errors. As a result, the overall percentage observations correctly called deteriorates with both 
types of composite so that they outperform only one univariate indicator in this respect. The 
composite approach raises Type II errors across the board and the general approach has a 
lower chance of Type II errors than the specific approach. Hence, we would expect the 
composite method to change the NTSR based on the general approach more than it changes 
the specific approach NTSR. The results confirm this since both the general composites are 
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equalised at a NTSR of 0.69 which is higher than virtually all the NTSRs for single indicators 
based on the same approach.  
 
Conversely, the specific threshold approach which already yields low Type I errors benefits 
from the composite method so that the composite specific threshold approach lowers the 
NTSR below that of virtually all the univariate indicators with the same methodology. Graph 
9 shows there is a difference in optimal percentile thresholds between the general and country 
specific approaches at the 4th percentile and the 10th percentile respectively. However using 
different values for the NTSR (0.5 and 0.75) as a criterion for individual indicator acceptance 
into the composite makes no difference to the optimal threshold or the optimal NTSR.  
 
To summarise, creating a composite indicator increases the likelihood of correctly calling 
crises compared to the univariate approach but raises the chances of false alarms. Although 
the general approach benefits in terms of crisis prediction, it is penalised by the higher level of 
Type II errors and the NTSR is correspondingly higher than when single variables act as 
signallers using the same approach. The gains in crisis identification from using a composite 
approach conform to the findings of Borio and Lowe (2002) although these authors found 
efficiency increased due to a reduction in Type II errors.  
 
Table 11: Comparison of In Sample Predictive Ability of Composite Indicators Using 
General and Country Specific Thresholds. 
 
 50 NTSR cut-off 75 NTSR cut-off 
 General General Country Specific 
Optimal Percentile 4 4 10 
NTSR 0.6911 0.6911 0.5541 
% crisis correct 7 7 15 
% no crisis correct 95 95 88 
% total correct 82 82 77 
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Graph 9: Comparison of Noise to Signal Ratios for Composite Indicators 
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3.6 Comparison of the Signal Extraction and Multivariate Logit Models.  
 
On the basis of in-sample predictive ability, the multivariate logit model outperforms the 
signal extraction approach in terms of the percentage of crises correctly predicted. Even the 
best leading indicator in the signal extraction approach (M2/ Reserves) is able to call only 
23% of crises correctly, whereas our dynamic multivariate models (regressions 5 and 6) are 
able to call an average of 32 % of crises, despite us setting our cut-off probability much 
higher than DD05 and well over 90% of crises using their 0.05 probability.  
 
Berg and Pattillo (1999) who conducted a comparison of multivariate probit and signal 
extraction EWS for currency crisis prediction also found the multivariate approach 
outperformed the univariate method. With the signal extraction approach, every indicator 
misses a substantial number of crises. Berg and Pattillo (1999) suggest this is because the 
signal extraction process assumes that a threshold for a variable is a discrete value and that 
whenever this is crossed, a crisis becomes impending.  In actual fact, as graphs 1-8 show, the 
NTSRs jump between thresholds so that there is no smooth relationship between threshold 
and crisis probability, something that Berg et al (2004) also note. If the NTSR jumps at 
different threshold for different countries, then using cross-country data to derive a common 
threshold may not be fruitful; the threshold that minimises the NTSR will fall on either side of 
the individual optimal thresholds for most countries. In this case, the percentage of crises 
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correctly called will be sub-optimal compared to where threshold are analysed for individual 
countries.  
 
The multivariate logit on the other hand, assumes a specific smooth non-linear form for the 
relationship between crisis probability and variable behaviour. As the results suggest, this may 
be closer to the truth of banking crises, especially once dynamics are taken into account and 
given that a large number of crisis episodes across many countries are being assessed 
simultaneously for both models. 
 
Even if indicators are aggregated to a composite, the percentages of crises predicted do not 
match the dynamic multivariate logit models, although percentage crisis prediction improves. 
An alternative approach to ours would be the Borio and Lowe (2002) methodology where 
individual variable thresholds are jointly evaluated. In this sense, composite indicator ability 
to predict crises is more comparable to the multivariate logit model than the univariate signal 
extraction procedure so the two procedures could be compared on the same dataset. This is a 
subject of further research for banking crisis prediction. 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
A comparison of the multinomial logit and signal extraction procedures shows that real GDP 
growth and terms of trade are robust leading indicators of banking crisis for our 
comprehensive sample. Results for other variables are mixed in terms of robustness and as 
comparison with the DD05 model shows, results vary according to the dataset used and the 
banking crisis definition adopted. Moreover, given the same dataset we show that the choice 
of estimation techniques makes a difference in terms of indicator performance and crisis 
prediction. Where a multinomial logit is used, transformations which take into account cross-
country heterogeneity may improve model specification since the use of logit prevents fixed 
effects estimation. Where a signal extraction procedure is used, optimising thresholds country 
by country improves ability to correctly predict crises. Creating composite indicators may 
further improve crisis prediction. Hence the use of the multinomial logit model may be better 
suited to a global EWS whereas the signal extraction approach may be better suited to country 
specific EWS. 
 
We also show that dynamics of banking crises are an extremely important consideration when 
designing an EWS since procyclical variables may have an independent effect on banking 
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crisis and a joint effect with institutional factors. In such cases the sequencing of institutional 
reforms and procyclical movements in credit and real GDP growth become important. Using 
contemporaneous data for all variables ignores the build up of financial instability that arises 
from the procyclical behaviour of many indicators. Once we took theory into account and 
used the data to incorporate a more realistic story of crisis, indicator significance improved. 
Despite a much higher probability threshold than the DD05 study, our logit model was able to 
call a significant proportion of crises correctly. 
 
As noted, international financial institutions do not employ an EWS specifically for banking 
crisis. However, given the ongoing liberalisation of emerging market financial sectors as well 
as the changing nature of banking risks as more economies move into market and securitised 
banking phases, the use of EWS for crisis prevention is more necessary than ever. As we have 
shown, it is important to consider the policy makers objectives when designing predictive 
models since there is a trade of between correctly calling crises and false alarms. In this sense 
our study confirms that EWS for banking crises are a necessary but not sufficient tool for 
predicting further crisis episodes, since a generalised global model cannot be a substitute for 
country-specific macroprudential surveillance.  
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APPENDIX:  
 
Country List 
Algeria India Switzerland 
Antigua/Barbuda Indonesia Syria 
Argentina Ireland Tanzania 
Australia Israel Thailand 
Austria Italy Togo 
Bahamas Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago 
Bahrain Japan Tunisia 
Bangladesh Jordan Turkey 
Barbados Kenya Uganda 
Belgium Korea UK 
Bolivia Laos Ukraine 
Botswana Lebanon Uruguay 
Brazil Madagascar USA 
Burundi Malaysia Venezuela 
Cameroon Mali Vietnam 
Canada Mauritius Zambia 
Chile Mexico Zimbabwe 
Colombia Mozambique  
Congo Myanmar  
Costa Rica Nepal  
Cyprus Netherlands  
Czech Republic New Zealand  
Denmark Nicaragua  
Dominica Niger  
Dominican republic Nigeria  
Ecuador Norway  
Egypt Panama  
El Salvador Papua New Guinea  
Equatorial Guinea Paraguay  
Ethiopia Peru  
Finland Philippines  
France Poland  
Germany Portugal  
Ghana Romania  
Greece Russia  
Grenada Senegal  
Guatemala Seychelles  
Guinea Bissau Sierra Leone  
Guyana Singapore  
Haiti South Africa  
Honduras Spain  
Hong Kong Sri Lanka  
Hungary Swaziland  
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